Daily Papers

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Probabilistic model checking is a technique for formal automated reasoning about software or hardware systems that operate in the context of uncertainty or stochasticity. It builds upon ideas and techniques from a diverse range of fields, from logic, automata and graph theory, to optimisation, numerical methods and control. In recent years, probabilistic model checking has also been extended to integrate ideas from game theory, notably using models such as stochastic games and solution concepts such as equilibria, to formally verify the interaction of multiple rational agents with distinct objectives. This provides a means to reason flexibly about agents acting in either an adversarial or a collaborative fashion, and opens up opportunities to tackle new problems within, for example, artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems. In this paper, we summarise some of the advances in this area, and highlight applications for which they have already been used. We discuss how the strengths of probabilistic model checking apply, or have the potential to apply, to the multi-agent setting and outline some of the key challenges required to make further progress in this field.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

We propose the Intuitive Reasoning Network (IRENE) - a novel neural model for intuitive psychological reasoning about agents' goals, preferences, and actions that can generalise previous experiences to new situations. IRENE combines a graph neural network for learning agent and world state representations with a transformer to encode the task context. When evaluated on the challenging Baby Intuitions Benchmark, IRENE achieves new state-of-the-art performance on three out of its five tasks - with up to 48.9% improvement. In contrast to existing methods, IRENE is able to bind preferences to specific agents, to better distinguish between rational and irrational agents, and to better understand the role of blocking obstacles. We also investigate, for the first time, the influence of the training tasks on test performance. Our analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of IRENE in combining prior knowledge gained during training for unseen evaluation tasks.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

There are two main barriers to using large language models (LLMs) in clinical reasoning. Firstly, while LLMs exhibit significant promise in Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, their performance in complex reasoning and planning falls short of expectations. Secondly, LLMs use uninterpretable methods to make clinical decisions that are fundamentally different from the clinician's cognitive processes. This leads to user distrust. In this paper, we present a multi-agent framework called ArgMed-Agents, which aims to enable LLM-based agents to make explainable clinical decision reasoning through interaction. ArgMed-Agents performs self-argumentation iterations via Argumentation Scheme for Clinical Discussion (a reasoning mechanism for modeling cognitive processes in clinical reasoning), and then constructs the argumentation process as a directed graph representing conflicting relationships. Ultimately, use symbolic solver to identify a series of rational and coherent arguments to support decision. We construct a formal model of ArgMed-Agents and present conjectures for theoretical guarantees. ArgMed-Agents enables LLMs to mimic the process of clinical argumentative reasoning by generating explanations of reasoning in a self-directed manner. The setup experiments show that ArgMed-Agents not only improves accuracy in complex clinical decision reasoning problems compared to other prompt methods, but more importantly, it provides users with decision explanations that increase their confidence.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) has recently emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). Yet, whether LLM agents can genuinely engage in deliberative reasoning, beyond simple ensembling or majority voting, remains unclear. We address this question through a controlled study using the Knight--Knave--Spy logic puzzle, which enables precise, step-wise evaluation of debate outcomes and processes under verifiable ground truth. We systematically set up six structural and cognitive factors, including agent team size, composition, confidence visibility, debate order, debate depth, and task difficulty, to disentangle their respective effects on collective reasoning. Our results show that intrinsic reasoning strength and group diversity are the dominant drivers of debate success, while structural parameters such as order or confidence visibility offer limited gains. Beyond outcomes, process-level analyses identify key behavioral patterns: majority pressure suppresses independent correction, effective teams overturn incorrect consensus, and rational, validity-aligned reasoning most strongly predicts improvement. These findings provide valuable insights into how and why LLM debates succeed or fail, offering guidance for designing interpretable and truth-seeking multi-agent reasoning systems.

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) agents primarily emphasize task completion, often overlooking resource efficiency and adaptability. This neglects a crucial capability: agents' ability to devise and adjust cost-optimal plans in response to changing environments. To bridge this gap, we introduce CostBench, a scalable, cost-centric benchmark designed to evaluate agents' economic reasoning and replanning abilities. Situated in the travel-planning domain, CostBench comprises tasks solvable via multiple sequences of atomic and composite tools with diverse, customizable costs. It also supports four types of dynamic blocking events, such as tool failures and cost changes, to simulate real-world unpredictability and necessitate agents to adapt in real time. Evaluating leading open-sourced and proprietary models on CostBench reveals a substantial gap in cost-aware planning: agents frequently fail to identify cost-optimal solutions in static settings, with even GPT-5 achieving less than 75% exact match rate on the hardest tasks, and performance further dropping by around 40% under dynamic conditions. By diagnosing these weaknesses, CostBench lays the groundwork for developing future agents that are both economically rational and robust.

We explore the task of improving persona consistency of dialogue agents. Recent models tackling consistency often train with additional Natural Language Inference (NLI) labels or attach trained extra modules to the generative agent for maintaining consistency. However, such additional labels and training can be demanding. Also, we find even the best-performing persona-based agents are insensitive to contradictory words. Inspired by social cognition and pragmatics, we endow existing dialogue agents with public self-consciousness on the fly through an imaginary listener. Our approach, based on the Rational Speech Acts framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012), can enforce dialogue agents to refrain from uttering contradiction. We further extend the framework by learning the distractor selection, which has been usually done manually or randomly. Results on Dialogue NLI (Welleck et al., 2019) and PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018) dataset show that our approach reduces contradiction and improves consistency of existing dialogue models. Moreover, we show that it can be generalized to improve context-consistency beyond persona in dialogues.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited notable efficacy in question-answering (QA) tasks across diverse domains. Their prowess in integrating extensive web knowledge has fueled interest in developing LLM-based autonomous agents. While LLMs are efficient in decoding human instructions and deriving solutions by holistically processing historical inputs, transitioning to purpose-driven agents requires a supplementary rational architecture to process multi-source information, establish reasoning chains, and prioritize critical tasks. Addressing this, we introduce FinMem, a novel LLM-based agent framework devised for financial decision-making. It encompasses three core modules: Profiling, to customize the agent's characteristics; Memory, with layered message processing, to aid the agent in assimilating hierarchical financial data; and Decision-making, to convert insights gained from memories into investment decisions. Notably, FinMem's memory module aligns closely with the cognitive structure of human traders, offering robust interpretability and real-time tuning. Its adjustable cognitive span allows for the retention of critical information beyond human perceptual limits, thereby enhancing trading outcomes. This framework enables the agent to self-evolve its professional knowledge, react agilely to new investment cues, and continuously refine trading decisions in the volatile financial environment. We first compare FinMem with various algorithmic agents on a scalable real-world financial dataset, underscoring its leading trading performance in stocks. We then fine-tuned the agent's perceptual span and character setting to achieve a significantly enhanced trading performance. Collectively, FinMem presents a cutting-edge LLM agent framework for automated trading, boosting cumulative investment returns.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.